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The Politics of Domestic Violence-Based Asylum Claims
JOLINE DOEDENS*
INTRODUCTION
The enduring difficulty of practicing asylum law is its discretionary nature.
It is not an inalienable right, guaranteed in the face of any infringement of state
sovereignty. Rather, it is legally and practically an international right realized in
a domestic space, under domestic law. International human rights law affirms an
individual’s right to seek refuge and asylum in another country in order to
escape persecution in his or her home country,1 and further ensures that a
receiving country cannot send an individual back to the country of his or her
persecution.2 The domestic legal systems of individual nations have the
discretion to define the criteria for obtaining such protection from persecution,
with the exception of general guidelines set out in the United Nations Handbook
on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status. As a result of this
domestic application of international human rights standards, the United States
is able to define the right, as it has with many international human rights
standards, as narrowly as it sees fit. The narrowed definition is further limited by
the discretion of the government officials charged with enforcing the human
rights standards. This is particularly true in the case of domestic violence-based
asylum claims. Not only do the he-said, she-said cases typical of domestic
violence incidents dominate domestic-violence based asylum claims, but the
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1. See generally, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (providing that “[e]veryone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other
countries asylum from persecution”); Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951,
1951 U.S.T. 563 (specifying the rights of asylees and refugees in a unified international instrument,
and defining a refugee as anyone who, as a result of persecution suffered before January 1, 1951, is
outside his or her country of origin); Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Oct. 4, 1967, 19
U.S.T. 6223 (expanding the definition of “refugee” by removing the temporal limitation); Declaration
on Territorial Asylum, G.A. Res. 2312 (XXII) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2312(XXII) (Dec. 14, 1967)
(specifying that the receiving state has the authority to evaluate an individual applicant’s eligibility
for asylum); and, U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of
Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (1992) (providing guidance to government officials
charged with determining refugee and asylee status).
2. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33, Apr. 22, 1954, 1951 U.S.T. 563 (“No
Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers
of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”); see also Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, Oct. 4, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, (incorporating articles 2 through 34 of the
1951 Convention, including the principle of non-refoulement in article 33 of the Convention).
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aggressor, as with most asylum claims, is also necessarily absent from the
proceedings. Instead, an Immigration Judge charged with enforcing the United
States’ immigration law must determine whether an individual’s experience of
domestic violence in an entirely separate country was neither too personal to the
individual perpetrator and victim, nor too universal an expression of (primarily
male) aggression.
My aim in this article is to demonstrate that the individual’s fundamental
right to be free from persecution is hardly fundamental at all in the case of
asylum law because it is subject to both a discretionary legal standard intended
to comply with international law standards and the discretionary application of
that standard in an individual case. Domestic violence as a ground for asylum is
particularly likely to fail under this dual discretionary framework because of
where such a claim falls within the legal framework. Unlike claims for asylum
based on race, religion, classic political opinion, or nationality, domestic
violence-based asylum claims must demonstrate that the feared or experienced
persecution occurred on account of either the individual applicant’s membership
in a particular social group, or an imputed political opinion of opposition to
female subjugation. Naturally, finding that such a particular social group exists,
or finding that an individual possesses such a circumscribed political opinion is
in itself subject to significant discretion, and can create a political conundrum.
In order to demonstrate the nullification of the asylum right in the case of a
victim of domestic violence, I will proceed first with a description of each of the
levels of discretion: the general requirements for a claim of asylum in the United
States, the discretionary application of such a standard in the various federal
circuits (particularly the Ninth Circuit, whose rule is separate and distinct from
its sister circuits), and the general requirements and application of those
requirements for an asylum claim based on membership in a particular social
group. I will then outline the development of domestic violence-based asylum
claims, starting with the Ninth Circuit case of Lazo-Majano v. I.N.S. in 1987, the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision in In re R-A- in 2001, and the BIA’s
recent decision in Matter of A-R-C-G- in August of 2014. Finally, I will compare
domestic violence-based asylum claims with other gender- and sex-based asylum
claims, such as those based on a fear of female genital mutilation and persecution
based on sexual orientation or transgender identity.
I.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK: ASYLUM LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

The foundational document defining refugees and outlining their basic
rights under international human rights law is the 1951 Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees.3 Although the Convention was originally intended to deal
only with the refugee crises caused by World War II, and was therefore limited
to individuals who had become refugees because of events occurring before
January 1, 1951, the drafters hoped the standards outlined in the Convention
would endure beyond this deadline.4 This was accomplished with the 1967
3. The 1951 Refugee Convention, U.N. REFUGEE AGENCY,
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49da0e466.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
4. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, The Refugee Convention, 1951: The Travaux Preparatoires
Analysed with a Commentary by Dr. Paul Weiss 4 (1990), available at
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Protocol to the Status of Refugees, which removed the Convention’s temporal
and geographic restrictions.5
Although the United States acceded to the 1967 Protocol on November 1,
1968, it was not until 1980 that Congress actually brought domestic law into
conformity with the country’s international obligations through the passage of
the Refugee Act of 1980.6 As a result, the 1951 Convention’s definition of a
refugee was codified in U.S. law as any person who “is unable or unwilling to
avail himself or herself of the protection of [his or her country of origin] because
of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”7
Although one would expect the codification of an internationally recognized
definition of a refugee to lead to uniform application of the law, in reality, the
United States initially granted asylum claims primarily when such an action
favored the country’s foreign policy interests.8 In the early 1990s, the
Immigration Naturalization Service (INS) divorced the adjudication of
affirmative asylum cases (i.e. those where applicants brought a claim of asylum
without first being charged with deportability) from the regular Examinations
Branch, creating a group of agents who specialized in asylum case review and
thereby decreasing the influence of ideological and foreign policy concerns in
asylum law.9
Even with the increased “neutrality” applied to the evaluation of asylum
applications, there is still plenty of opportunity for discretion, most notably
through the interpretation of the codified definition of a refugee by Immigration
Judges (IJs), the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and federal appeals court
judges. Under the statutory definition of a refugee, an applicant must show (1) a
well-founded fear (2) of persecution (3) on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.10 Before proceeding
with a discussion of what this definition of refugee means for victims of domestic
violence who wish to apply for asylum, it is first necessary to examine how this
definition has evolved through case law.
A. How Afraid Are You? Establishing a Well-Founded Fear of Persecution
Under the statutory definition of a refugee, an asylum applicant must have
a well-founded fear of persecution.11 However, what constitutes “persecution” is
not statutorily defined, and has only been developed through the case law of the
Board of Immigration Appeals. In the seminal case of Matter of Acosta, the BIA
noted that “persecution” has generally been construed to mean “either a threat to
http://www.unhcr.org/4ca34be29.html (citing Recommendation E. of the Convention, in which the
Conference “[e]xpressed the hope that the Convention would have value as an example exceeding its
contractual scope . . . .”).
5. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. I, concluded Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223.
6. Id.; Refugee Act, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
7. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012).
8. IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER, ESSENTIALS OF ASYLUM LAW 1-1 (2d ed. 2013).
9. Id.
10. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012).
11. Id.
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the life or freedom of, or the infliction of suffering or harm upon, those who
differ in a way regarded as offensive.”12 Since the federal courts of appeals must
generally apply Chevron deference to any agency interpretation of a governing
statute that is reasonable, this understanding of what constitutes “persecution”
also applies on appeal from the BIA.13 However, persecution may arise out of the
cumulative effect of harm resulting from incidents that would not independently
amount to persecution, such as discrimination under conditions of insecurity in
the country of origin, according to the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugees Status, which is published by the Office of the High
Commissioner for Refugees and considered a relevant source for interpreting
U.S. asylum law.14
A further complication in finding a well-founded fear of persecution is that
such a fear is necessarily subjective and objective. That is, the applicant must
both experience the persecution as such, and a reasonable individual under his
or her circumstances must also experience the conduct at issue as persecution.15
Interestingly, the BIA has held that the perpetrator of the allegedly persecutory
conduct need not intend to harm or to persecute the applicant for his or her
conduct to qualify as persecution.16 By broadening the definition of persecution
in this way, the BIA has created room for asylum claims based on cultural
practices, such as female genital mutilation.
Further room for asylum claims based on “private,” superficially apolitical
persecution is evident in the possibility of persecution by both state and nonstate actors. Where an applicant believes she has suffered persecution at the
hands of a state actor (i.e. a member of the government or a governmentsponsored organization), she does not need to show that she attempted to report
the suffered harm (or the fear of such harm) to the local police.17 However, when
12. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985).
13. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (holding
that, on review of an agency’s construction of its governing statute, a court must first determine
whether the agency has contradicted Congress’s clearly expressed intent; if Congress has not
expressed any clear intent, then the court must determine “whether the agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute”). See Taing v. Napolitano, 567 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 2009)
(outlining the two-step analysis from Chevron in an immigration context); United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (“The weight accorded to an administrative judgment will depend
upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking
power to control . . . .”) (internal quotations omitted).
14. Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status ¶ 53 (1992), available at
http://www.hrea.org/learn/tutorials/refugees/Handbook/hbpart1.htm#Handbook Chapter One
[hereinafter U.N. Handbook]; Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
438–39 (1987) (finding the Handbook an appropriate source for interpreting asylum law, given that
the entire purpose of the Refugee Act of 1980 was to bring U.S. domestic law into conformity with its
international obligations).
15. U.N. Handbook, supra note 14, ¶ 52.
16. Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996) (holding that a subjective “punitive”
or “malignant” intent is not required for the harm to constitute persecution in the context of the
common cultural practice of female genital cutting).
17. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(3)(ii) (2013) (“In cases in which the persecutor is a government or is
government sponsored . . . it shall be presumed that internal relocation would not be reasonable . . .
.”); Baballah v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 1067, 1078 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that “when the government is
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the applicant has suffered harm that she believes amounts to persecution from a
non-state actor, she must show that the government is unwilling or unable to
control the violence, either by showing that the government tried and failed to
protect her, or by showing the government refused to take action to protect her.18
Although the easiest way for an applicant to show that her government is
unwilling or unable to protect her is by showing a record (or lack thereof) of
police action taken after she filed a report, she can also demonstrate the futility of
making a police report by providing evidence that others have “made reports of
similar incidents to no avail,” or by showing that “private persecution of a
particular sort is widespread and well-known but not controlled by the
government.”19
Case law and relevant regulations have also limited the types of harm that
amount to persecution. For example, while multiple beatings and non-life
threatening violence can be sufficient in some cases, in other cases, courts have
refused to recognize even multiple beatings as persecution.20 However, there are
certain gender-based inflictions of violence that usually qualify as persecution.
For example, in Ochave v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Ninth Circuit
held that “[r]ape is the kind of infliction of suffering or harm that may support a
finding of past persecution, provided that the applicant demonstrates that the
rape was on account of a statutorily protected ground, such as an imputed
political opinion.”21 Similarly, the BIA has held that female genital mutilation can
constitute persecution.22 The Department of Justice emphasizes, however, that a
victim must experience the treatment as harm in order to have suffered
persecution.23
An applicant may also, in some cases, establish persecution based on
mental, emotional, and psychological harm. For example, in Kovac v. Immigration
and Naturalization Service, the Ninth Circuit held that persecution could result
from both physical and mental harm.24 Similarly, in Abay v. Ashcroft, the Sixth
Circuit held that a mother could establish persecution based on her “fear that her
daughter [would] be subjected to the torture of female genital mutilation.”25 In
the domestic violence context, these precedents, despite coming from the federal
courts instead of the BIA, are useful for the proposition that persecution is not
necessarily limited to physical harm, but could be supplemented by
psychological harm, which in fact often increases the total trauma experienced by
the victim.26
responsible for persecution . . . no inquiry into whether a petitioner reported the persecution to police
is necessary”).
18. ESSENTIALS OF ASYLUM LAW, supra note 8, at 2-4 to 2-5.
19. Rahimzadeh v. Holder, 613 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Afriye v. Holder, 613 F.3d,
924, 932–33 (9th Cir. 2010) and Avetova-Elisseva v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 213 F.3d
1192, 1198 (9th Cir. 2000)).
20. ESSENTIALS OF ASYLUM LAW, supra note 8, at 2-8.
21. Ochave v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 254 F.3d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 2001).
22. Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996).
23. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76588, 76590 (proposed Dec. 7, 2000).
24. Kovac v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 407 F.2d 102, 106–07 (9th Cir. 1969).
25. Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2004).
26. NATIONAL COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, PSYCHOLOGICAL ABUSE 1–2, available at
http://www.ncadv.org/files/PsychologicalAbuse.pdf.
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It is also important to note the difference between having a well-founded
fear based on past persecution, and a well-founded fear of future persecution.
Under the regulations governing asylum applications, if an applicant can
demonstrate past persecution, she is entitled to the presumption that she will
have a well-founded fear of persecution in the future.27 With this presumption,
the burden shifts to the government to show either that there has been a
“fundamental change in circumstance such that the applicant no longer has a
well-founded fear of persecution,” or that the applicant could reasonably relocate
within her country of origin in order to avoid persecution.28 In the case of
domestic and other family violence, it may often be possible for the government
to argue that it would be reasonable for an asylum applicant to relocate within
her home country and thereby escape the violence.
Finally, the refugee definition also requires that an applicant’s fear of
persecution be well founded. This does not mean that the applicant has a greater
than 50% chance of suffering persecution upon return to her country of origin.
Rather, the applicant must demonstrate a subjectively genuine and objectively
reasonable fear of returning to her country of origin.29 In determining whether
the applicant’s fear of persecution is objectively reasonable, courts consider
various factors, including: (1) whether the applicant was individually targeted;30
(2) whether any of the applicant’s family members have suffered violence at the
hands of alleged persecutors;31 (3) whether there is a pattern or practice of
persecution of similarly situated individuals in the applicant’s country of
origin;32 and (4) whether the threat of persecution for the applicant is countrywide.33
B. Does Your Fear Qualify You as a Refugee?: Establishing the Nexus Between a
Well-Founded Fear of Persecution and the Protected Ground
An applicant does not qualify for asylum merely by showing that he or she
has a well-founded fear of persecution. No matter how terrible the harm
suffered, an applicant cannot qualify for asylum unless she can also show that
the persecution occurred on account of one of the five enumerated grounds – (1)
race, (2) religion, (3) national original, (4) membership in a particular social
group, or (5) political opinion – by showing some evidence of the persecutor’s
motives.34 The problem in practice, of course, is that persecutors are not purists.
27. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2013).
28. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A)–(B) (2013).
29. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431, 440 (1987).
30. Salari v. Ashcroft, 114 F. App’x 815, 816 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Even if this past harm were not
sufficient to demonstrate past persecution, it does demonstrate the reasonableness of [the applicant’s]
fear of future persecution.”)
31. Korablina v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 158 F.3d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir. 1998)
(“Persecution may be found by cumulative, specific instances of violence and harassment toward an
individual or her family members . . . .”)
32. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(iii) (2013).
33. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(ii) (2013).
34. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483–84 (1992) (holding
that an asylum applicant must show at least some proof the alleged persecutor’s motivation in order
to fulfill the “on the account of” requirement).
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In many cases, an alleged persecutor harms an asylum applicant for several
reasons, only one of which may constitute an enumerated grounds.35 Under the
REAL ID Act of 2005, Congress dictated that race, religion, national origin,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion “was or will be at
least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.”36
Race, religion, and national origin are not used as enumerated grounds in
domestic violence-based asylum claims, and are therefore outside the scope of
this paper, but membership in a particular social group and political opinion are
applicable in the case of domestic violence.
1. Take a Stand. . . or Don’t: How Political Do You Need to Be?
A political opinion, for the purposes of the refugee definition, need not be
expressed through participation in organized political activities.37 Further, a
qualifying political opinion may be expressed non-verbally or only in private.38
There is no requirement that an asylum applicant act on her political opinion in
order to be subject to persecution on account of that political opinion.39 A
political opinion can actually include the view that certain rights, such as the
right to privacy, the right to bodily integrity, the right to have a family, and the
right to have unfettered reproductive choice, are fundamental and that “the
election to exercise them should be respected and not trampled.”40
Furthermore, a political opinion may be imputed when through legally
cognizable inferences or otherwise, “an alien establishes a prima facie case that he
is likely to be persecuted because of the government’s belief about his views or
loyalties, his actual political conduct, be it silence or affirmative advocacy, and
his actual political views, be they neutrality or partisanship, are irrelevant;
False”41 As such, even if an individual does not himself or herself hold a
particular political opinion that a persecutor opposes, that political opinion may
be imputed to the asylum applicant if the persecutor was motivated by that
political opinion to persecute the applicant. For example, in Hernandez-Ortiz v.
Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Board of Immigration Appeals

35. See Gafoor v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 231 F.3d 645, 650 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“[M]otives can be difficult to pin down . . . Persecutors do not always take the time to tell their
victims all the reasons they are being beaten or kidnaped or killed.”)
36. REAL ID Act of 2005, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012).
37. Meza-Menay v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 139 F.3d 759, 763 (9th Cir. 1998).
38. Rivas-Martinez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 997 F.2d 1143, 1147 (5th Cir. 1993)
(rejecting the BIA’s reasoning that, since the applicant gave a non-political excuse for not assisting her
alleged persecutors, she necessarily was not persecuted on account of her political opinion because
(1) it would be absurd to require asylum applicants to “foolhardily court death by informed armed
guerrillas to their faces that she detests them or their actions or their ideologies,” and (2) it is wrong
to assume that the persecutors believed the applicant’s proffered non-political reason for her refusal
to comply with their demands).
39. ESSENTIALS OF ASYLUM LAW, supra note 8, at 3-8 (citing DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM
IN THE UNITED STATES 297 (Paul T. Lufkin ed., 3d ed. 1999)).
40. In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 921−22 (B.I.A. 1997) (concurring opinion) overruled on other
grounds by Att’y Gen. Order No. 2964-2008 (May 15, 2008).
41. Hernandez-Ortiz v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 777 F.2d 509, 517 (9th Cir. 1985),
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Parussimova v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir.
2008).
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considered evidence of the government of El Salvador killing, kidnapping,
beating, threatening, robbing, and harassing the applicant’s family members to
find that she had established a prima facie case of persecution on account of her
imputed political opinion, even though the applicant herself had not suffered
such violence.42
2. To Which Clique Do You Belong?: Define Your Particular Social Group
In order to establish membership in a particular social group as a ground
for persecution, an asylum applicant must meet a high standard subject to the
discretion of the IJ. First, the applicant must demonstrate that membership in his
or her particular social group is based on an immutable characteristic, judicially
defined as “a characteristic that either is beyond the power of an individual to
change or is so fundamental to individual identity or conscience that it ought not
be required to be changed.”43 Such a characteristic could be innate, such as sex,
color, or kinship ties, or a shared experience, such as former military leadership
or land ownership.44
Second, an applicant must show that his or her proposed particular social
group has sufficient “particularity”—that the group is “sufficiently distinct that it
would constitute a discrete class of persons.”45 In other words, the applicant
must be able to show that the immutable characteristics “provide a clear
benchmark for determining who falls within the group.”46
Last, the applicant must supply a particular social group that has sufficient
“social distinction” or “social visibility.” In essence, the proposed group must be
perceived as a group by the society in which it is situated; members of the
relevant society need not be able to identify the group’s members on sight.47
Examples of groups that satisfy these three requirements include family ties, clan
membership, sexual orientation, and former gang membership.48 Gender, as a
relevant immutable characteristic that applicants either cannot change or should
not be required to change, qualifies as a defining characteristic of a social group,
along with other “immutable/fundamental characteristics”, including bodily
integrity and refusal to conform or submit.49
II. WORKING WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK?: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE-BASED ASYLUM
When the refugee definition was first codified in 1951, domestic violence
was not understood as a punishable offense in many countries, let alone as
grounds for claiming asylum. In the United States, from the 1920s through the
1970s, victims of domestic abuse (i.e. wife beating and child abuse) were seen as
part of the problem, and “domestic trouble cases” were seen as an opportunity to

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 516–17.
Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
Id.
Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 210 (B.I.A. 2014) (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 214.
Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 240 (B.I.A. 2014).
ESSENTIALS OF ASYLUM LAW, supra note 8, at 3-25 to 3-29.
Id. at 3-32.
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help women “master the habits of cleanliness, nutrition, and childcare.”50 Thus,
the concept of domestic violence was considered a private issue, to be solved
only by ensuring that the victims of violence stopped causing their batterers to
get angry and attack. If an applicant had proposed, even after the signing of the
1967 Protocol, that domestic violence could be a basis for asylum, adjudicators
likely would have ridiculed those lawyers radical enough to bring such a claim.
Nevertheless, ever since the Board of Immigration Appeals first held in
Matter of Acosta that sex was among the immutable characteristics that could
define a particular social group, two legal theories have evolved for treating
domestic violence as a qualifying form of persecution.51
A. Are You Feminist Enough?: Political Opinion as a Basis For Gender-Based
Asylum
First, the doctrine of imputed political opinion can be used where the victim
opposed laws that discriminate against her on the basis of gender, or where she
fears persecution on the basis of her feminist beliefs. Iranian women seem to be
the most compelling case for an imputed political opinion, although the courts
are reluctant to actually grant these women’s asylum applications. For example,
in Fatin v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Third Circuit held that an
Iranian woman who opposed Iran’s gender-specific laws was not entitled to
asylum because she did not show that she was a member of her proposed
particular social group (women who would prefer to suffer the consequences of
noncompliance with the discriminatory laws).52 In addition, the applicant never
showed that she would refuse to comply with the gender-specific laws.53
Similarly, in Sharif v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Seventh
Circuit found that even if “Westernized women” in Iran constituted a particular
social group, the applicant failed to show that she would be “either unable or
unwilling to comply with Iranian law when she return[ed] to Iran.”54 The
applicant further failed to prove that she would voice her Western notions when
she returned to Iran, since she had no history of objecting to Iran’s discriminatory
laws.55 The Court sympathized with the applicant because it understood that a
woman who did not agree with the prevailing gender hierarchy in Iran would
not enjoy living there, but it found that a preference for an American lifestyle
was not sufficient for a successful asylum claim.56
Finally, in Safaie v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Eighth Circuit
held that an Iranian woman who advocated women’s rights and opposed Iranian
dress and behavior codes for women was not entitled to asylum because the
applicant wore the required dress and was not actually harmed or mistreated for
50. KATHARINE T. BARTLETT, ET AL., GENDER AND THE LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY
386 (6th ed. 2013) (citing Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to
Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 992–93 (1995)).
51. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
52. Fatin v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993).
53. Id.
54. Sharif v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 87 F.3d 932, 936 (7th Cir. 1996).
55. Id.
56. Id.
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participating in the taboo activities of smoking and wearing makeup.57 Further,
the Court found that the applicant did not have some “missionary fever to defy
the law,” and could in fact avoid any danger of persecution by refraining from
expressing her opposition to the restrictions on women’s activities in Iranian
law.58
The question of whether an Iranian woman should be required to risk
subjecting herself to corporal punishment in Iran in order to establish her
membership in a women’s rights-minded, particular social group is a matter
outside the scope of this paper, but demonstrates another instance in which the
requirements for a successful asylum claim can seem unreasonable. These
gender-based political opinion cases are themselves highly political. In all three
cases, the federal court is reluctant to condone the discriminatory laws in force in
Iran, but the judges are also hesitant to find that opposition to those laws
qualifies an individual woman for asylum. In Fatin, the Third Circuit held that
the applicant did not qualify for asylum because she did not actually express her
opposition to the discriminatory laws.59 This seems to contradict the standard
enumerated in Rivas-Martinez, where the Fifth Circuit pointed out that it would
be ridiculous to require political opponents to express their disfavored opinions
to their possible persecutors;60 the essential requirement is that the persecutor
must have persecuted the applicant, or will likely persecute the applicant in the
future on his or her return to his or her country of origin on account of that
political opinion.
The Seventh Circuit made a similar erroneous distinction in Sharif, when it
found that the applicant did not qualify for asylum in part because she was not
likely to express her western point of view about a woman’s role in society upon
her return to Iran.61 The Eighth Circuit departed even further from the RivasMartinez standard in Safaie when it acknowledged that the applicant would
continue to engage in taboo activities upon her return to Iran, and thereby would
express her political opposition, but that the applicant did not qualify for asylum
because she did not possess the requisite missionary zeal to fight the
discriminatory laws, and would be willing to refrain from expressing her
opinions in order to avoid persecution.62
B. Are You Unique Enough?: Membership in a Particular Social Group as a Basis
for Gender-Based Asylum Claims
As is apparent from the discussion of the Iranian cases in the previous
subsection, the federal courts and the BIA have a tendency to mingle the
standards for membership in a particular social group and political opinion,
finding that an individual who held feminist beliefs did not express them clearly,
loudly, and consistently enough to qualify for membership in the relevant
57. Safaie v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 25 F.3d 636, 640 (8th Cir. 1994), superseded by
statute on other grounds as stated in Ngengwe v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1029, 1035 (8th Cir. 2008).
58. Id.
59. Fatin v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993).
60. Rivas-Martinez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 997 F.2d 1143, 1147 (5th Cir. 1993).
61. Sharif, 87 F.3d at 936.
62. Safaie, 25 F.3d at 640.
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particular social group. As a result, it is important not only to ensure that the
applicant actually fits into the proposed particular social group, but also that the
proposed group is defined by immutable characteristics that make the group
sufficiently particular and socially distinct.
For example, in Kante v. Holder, the Sixth Circuit found that the particular
social group of “women subjected to rape as a method of government control”
did not qualify as a group for the purposes of an asylum claim because they were
circularly defined by the persecution suffered—the members (women subjected
to rape as a method of government control) suffered persecution on account of
such membership because they were raped as a method of government control,
or were at risk of such treatment (i.e. the persecution).63 In addition, the Court
found that the broader social group of just women (defined by the immutable
characteristic of sex) did not qualify because the applicant did not show that the
Guinean government or society “viewed females as a group specifically targeted
for mistreatment.”64
An example of a successful asylum claim based on membership in a
particular social group is in the Third Circuit case of Gomez-Zuluaga v. Attorney
General of the United States. In that case, the Court denied the applicant’s claims
that her abduction and involuntary confinement by a guerilla group, and her
subsequent surveillance by the group to determine whether she was dating any
government officers, qualified her for asylum because the applicant’s political
opinion was not “one central reason” for her persecution.65 Thus, she was not
entitled to the presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution based on
her past persecution. However, the Court did find that the applicant had a wellfounded fear of persecution based on her membership in the particular social
group of Colombian women who escaped involuntary servitude after being
abducted and confined by a guerrilla group.66 The defined social group was not
circular because the feared persecution was death, not abduction or confinement.
Further, the Court found that this fear was subjectively genuine—the applicant
feared she would be killed if she did not go back to work for the guerrilla
group.67 In addition, the applicant’s fear was objectively reasonable because
several of her family members had been harmed or threatened by the guerrilla
group, the applicant herself had been receiving threatening phone calls and
messages since her abduction, and state department reports supported her
argument that the guerrilla group practiced “systemic and pervasive” forced
conscription and violence.68
The principal difference between Kante and Gomez-Zuluaga is one of degree
as well as credibility of the witness. The applicant in Kante had been attacked in
the past, but the Court found that she failed to establish that the attack was
caused by Guinean government forces motivated by retribution for her father’s
political activity, and was hesitant to trust her description of the past attack

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Kante v. Holder, 634 F.3d 321, 326–27 (6th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 327.
Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 527 F.3d 330, 341 (3d Cir. 2008).
Id. at 346–48.
Id. at 347.
Id. at 347–48.
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because she changed the description of her attackers between her first and
second asylum applications.69 Of course, it is well established that one symptom
of rape trauma syndrome is an inability to recall the specific events of the
trauma, so it is not at all surprising that an asylum applicant, faced with the
ominous task of describing her attackers for the purposes of avoiding
deportation to the country where she was attacked, would have confused
memories of what her attackers looked like.70 This is not to say that all asylum
applicants who claim memory loss on account of rape trauma syndrome are
necessarily credible and should automatically be granted asylum on account of
an appropriately defined particular social group. Rather, asylum law and
immigration law in general should at least place the memory loss in the context
of the trauma suffered, as is done in domestic U.S. criminal law.71
By contrast, in Gomez-Zuluaga, the applicant suffered a considerably less
gendered form of past persecution (abduction and confinement), even though
this past persecution did not qualify her for asylum because it was not on
account of an enumerated ground. Further, she was able to identify a particular
social group that was not defined by a gendered harm (such as rape), and did not
suffer from the problem of circularity. In Gomez-Zuluaga, the inclusion of
“women” in the definition of the proposed particular social group was nothing
more than a limiting characteristic. It had very little bearing on the type of
persecution that would be suffered. Sex in this case was nothing more than a
benchmark that helped to define who was in the group and who was not.
Further, the applicant did not suffer from the unfortunate possible memory loss
that the applicant in Kante could have experienced as a result of her past attack.
C. The Legal Basis for Domestic Violence as a Basis for Asylum
The first successful domestic violence-based asylum case was the Ninth
Circuit decision in Lazo-Majano v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. There, an
army sergeant physically and sexually abused a female applicant, compelling her
to leave the country.72 The Court found that persecution was “stamped on every
page” of the record, and that the applicant had been “singled out to be bullied,
beaten, injured, raped, and enslaved.”73 The Court determined that the sergeant
had “assert[ed] the political opinion that a man has a right to dominate,” and
69. Kante, 634 F.3d at 325.
70. Rape Trauma Syndrome, CMTY. CRISIS CTR., INC.,
http://www.crisiscenter.org/images/SAINDoc7.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2014). See also Holly
Hogan, The False Dichotomy of Rape Trauma Syndrome, 12 CARDOZO J. L. & GEND. 529, 533 (2005-2006)
(citing several studies supporting the proposition that “rape victims may have trouble remembering
and may even give inconsistent statements about the rape, which may be counterintuitive behavior
responses to some who believe that one would never forget such a traumatic experience”).
71. BARTLETT, ET AL., supra note 50, at 631–32 (noting that “[s]ome courts have approved use of
expert testimony about rape trauma syndrome to help prove that a forcible assault, rather than
consensual sex, occurred . . . .”)
72. Lazo-Majano v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 813 F.2d 1432, 1433 (9th Cir. 1987)
overruled on other grounds by Fisher v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 79 F.3d 955, 963 (9th Cir.
1996) (holding that the Court of Appeals’ review is limited to the administrative record on which the
deportation order is based and the Attorney General’s findings of fact).
73. Id. at 1434.
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that the applicant showed her opposition to that political opinion by fleeing the
country.74 The applicant was not allowed to hold an opinion contrary to that of
the sergeant—“[w]hen by flight, she asserted one, she became exposed to
persecution for her assertion. Persecution threatened her because of her political
opinion.”75 Once again, the Court had trouble basing its decision on the gendered
violence that the applicant suffered at the hands of her persecutor. Instead, the
Court imagined both the persecutor and the victim to have a political opinion
about the appropriate power relation between the sexes. Further, given the
persecutor’s position in the Armed Forces, “a military power that exercises
domination over much of El Salvador despite the staunchest efforts of the Duarte
government to restrain it,” the Court easily got around the issue of whether the
applicant’s fear of persecution would be country-wide—she reasonably believed
that the sergeant would be able to use his connections to find her if she escaped
within El Salvador.76
The Lazo-Majano approach of using a domestic violence victim’s political
beliefs for a claim of asylum stood alone in immigration case law until 1999,
when the Board of Immigration Appeals tackled the case of Rody Alvarado.
Rody’s husband spent the entirety of their marriage mistreating her.77 He had to
know what she was doing at every moment of every day and accompanied her
everywhere except for her workplace.78 He threatened her with stories of killing
babies and the elderly while he was in the army, and often got drunk.79 When
Rody complained about her husband’s drinking he would yell at her, and once
clenched her hand and continued drinking until he passed out.80 Over the course
of the marriage, the violence increased, as Rody’s husband dislocated her jaw
when her period was 15 days late, and beat her before and after he raped her.81 If
she resisted, her husband would accuse her of cheating and threaten to kill her.82
Rody tried to escape her husband’s wrath by running away to the homes of
family members, but he always found her.83 When she tried to flee the city with
her children, her husband found them again, and beat her unconscious.84 During
the trial, Rody at first maintained that she did not know why her husband
treated her so badly, but she guessed it had something to do with his own
mistreatment during his time in the army.85 Rody also tried to report her
husband’s abusive behavior to the police and to the courts. Her husband ignored
the police’s summons to appear and the police failed to take further action. A
judge told Rody that he “would not interfere in domestic disputes.”86 The BIA,
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 1435.
Id.
Id. at 1434.
In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec 906, 908 (B.I.A. 1999).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 909 (B.I.A. 1999).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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upon hearing the horrific tales of Rody’s abuse, “struggle[d] to describe how
deplorable [the court] find[s] the husband’s conduct to have been.”87 Neither the
Immigration Judge nor the BIA had much trouble finding that the beatings and
rapes Rody suffered constituted past persecution, and that the Guatemalan
government was unwilling or unable to control Rody’s husband.88 The IJ found
that Rody was persecuted both on account of her imputed political opinion “that
women should not be dominated by men,” and on account of her membership in
the particular social group of “Guatemalan women who have been involved
intimately with Guatemalan male companions who believe that women are to
live under male domination.”89
On the first hearing of the case, however, the Board of Immigration Appeals
struggled to find a ground for a domestic violence-based asylum claim.
Reviewing the record, the BIA found no indication of any political opinion of the
applicant, and inferred from the duration and the persistence of the abuse,
despite Rody’s many attempts to appease her husband, that the abuse was
completely unrelated to any political opinion, imputed or actual.90 Further, the
BIA found that Rody’s proposed particular social group (“Guatemalan women
who have been intimately involved with Guatemalan male companions who
believe that women are to live under male domination”) did not qualify because
it was defined for the purposes of the asylum case, and it seemed unlikely that
any Guatemalan might recognize such a social group within their own society.91
Moreover, the BIA failed to see how Rody’s husband’s behavior occurred on
account of her membership in such a social group, since he did not “show[] an
interest in any member of the group other than [Rody] herself.”92 Finding that
Congress did not intend “social group” to provide a legal basis for domestic
violence-based asylum claims, the Court punted the case back to the parties and
to Congress, noting that the district director could grant Rody relief on
humanitarian grounds, and that Congress could amend the asylum law to
include an asylum claim for abused women.93
In the nine years after the initial BIA decision, Attorney General Reno
vacated the decision, the Department of Homeland Security issued a brief that
conceded Rody’s eligibility for asylum based on her membership in the
particular social group of “married women in Guatemala who are unable to
leave their relationship,” and the DHS issued proposed regulations that have
never been finalized. Finally, in 2008, Attorney General Mukasey directed the
BIA to revisit the case in light of the new criteria of social visibility and

87. Id. at 910.
88. Id. at 911.
89. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 911 (B.I.A. 1999).
90. Id. at 916 (“The respondent’s husband, it seems, must have had some reason or reasons for
treating the respondent as he did. And it is possible that his own view of men and women played a
role in his brutality, as may have been the case with the brutality that he himself experienced and
witnessed. What we find lacking in the respondent’s showing, however, is any meaningful evidence
that her husband’s behavior was influenced at all by his perception of the respondent’s opinion.”).
91. Id. at 918
92. Id. at 920.
93. Id. at 928.
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particularity of particular social groups.94 However, the original reasoning of the
first BIA decision still applied, since Rody was granted asylum by the IJ in a onesentence unpublished opinion.95 As such, the heightened (and confusing)
standards for what constitutes membership in a particular social group
continued to apply: a victim of spousal abuse had to see herself (or himself) as a
member of the defined social group, the abusers themselves also had to see their
victims as a member of this group, and society itself had to consider the
characteristic of being abused important.96 The stringency of these factors had the
effect of making domestic violence-based asylum claims a very fact-intensive
process that involved the recruitment of experts to testify on the perception of
domestic violence in the applicant’s country of origin, and extensive preparation
of the applicant herself (or himself), to ensure that she effectively portrayed her
perception of herself as a member of the relevant social group, and that her
abuser identified her as a group member as well.
Running almost parallel with Rody Alvarado’s case was the case of Ms. L-R,97 who was raped at gunpoint by her 33-year-old sports coach when she was just
nineteen years old, and subsequently suffered almost two decades of
“unrelenting physical, sexual and emotional torment” from her attacker, who
became her common-law husband.98 When L-R- became pregnant, she attempted
to escape her abuser’s wrath and fled through a window, but her abuser found
her at the bus stop, brought her home, locked her in their bedroom, and tried to
kill her by burning her alive when she fell asleep that night.99 Luckily, she
managed to put out the fire with wet towels.100 Although it was very difficult for
L-R- to report her abuser’s behavior to the police due to his constant supervision,
she managed to sneak out and file police reports on about eight occasions.
However, every time she made a report, “the officer in charge made her show
him her bruises, and touched her, before telling [her] that there was nothing the
police could do because [her husband’s] abuse was a private matter and her life
was not in danger.”101 Moreover, whenever L-R- went to the police, her abuser
immediately found out about it because he was friendly with several police
officers, and he would beat her even more as punishment.102
In April 1995, L-R- returned home from work to find an empty house—all of
her belongings and her children were gone, taken by her husband.103 She tried to
94. ESSENTIALS OF ASYLUM LAW, supra note 8, at 3-36.
95. Karen Musalo, A Short History of Gender Asylum in the United States: Resistance and
Ambivalence May Very Slowly Be Inching Towards Recognition of Women’s Claims, 29 REFUGEE SURVEY
QUARTERLY 46, 47 (2010).
96. ESSENTIALS OF ASYLUM LAW, supra note 8, at 3-37.
97. Unlike Rody Alvarado, Ms. L-R-’s name has not been made public, as all asylum cases are
confidential.
98. Brief for Respondents in Support of Applications for Asylum, Withholding of Removal and
CAT Relief at 10, Matter of L-R- (B.I.A. Mar. 10, 2010),
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/L-R-_brief_immigration_court_03_10_2010.pdf
[hereinafter CGRS Brief].
99. Id. at 19.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 20–21.
102. Id. at 21.
103. Id. at 23.
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get help from the Desarrollo Integral de la Familia (DIF), an organization in the
Mexican government that assists individuals with domestic violence problems,
but the DIF attorney refused to help L-R- because her sister was president of DIF
in a different town.104 L-R- also tried to go to court to get custody of her children,
but the first judge awarded custody to her abuser, despite his knowledge of the
abuse.105 The second judge informed L-R- that he would award her custody of
her kids if she had sex with him.106 L-R- refused, and the judge accused her of
being a bad mother, because “a good mother would do anything to get back her
children.”107
As a result of the extensive trauma she suffered, L-R- developed debilitating
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which prevented her from applying for
asylum within the one-year deadline upon her arrival in the United States.108 The
Immigration Judge consequently denied her claim, noting that she was perfectly
capable of caring for her children, and further held that her abuser did not abuse
her on account of any political opinion or membership in a particular social
group, but merely because he was a violent man.109 Although the Department of
Homeland Security initially defended the IJ’s ruling, the Department changed its
position once President Obama took office, recommending that L-R- and her
children redefine their proposed social group in order to avoid circularity
problems and comply with the particularity and social visibility requirements
that emerged in the case law during the pendency of the case.110 Originally, L-Rargued that she suffered persecution on account of her membership in the
particular social group of “Mexican women in an abusive domestic relationship
who are unable to leave.”111 The inclusion of “abusive” in the definition of the
group rendered the definition impermissibly circular, as the persecution suffered
was a condition of group membership. The Department of Homeland Security
proposed two alternative groups that would meet the legal requirements—
”Mexican women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave,” or
“Mexican women who are viewed as property by virtue of their positions within
a domestic relationship”—and proposed that the case be remanded for
additional fact-finding.112 On remand, the Center for Gender and Refugee
Studies, who represented Ms. L-R-, submitted country condition reports
demonstrating the atmosphere of indifference toward gender-based violence in
Mexico, the machismo culture, and the widespread tolerance for domestic
violence, as well as two affidavits from experts evidencing these same

104. Id. at 24–25.
105. Id. at 25.
106. Id. at 26.
107. Id.
108. Matter of L-R-, CTR. FOR GEND. & REFUGEE STUDIES, http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/ourwork/matter-l-r (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
109. Id.
110. Dep’t of Homeland Security’s Supplemental Brief, Matter of L-R- at 6 (B.I.A. Apr. 13, 2009),
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/Matter_of_LR_DHS_Brief_4_13_2009.pdf
[hereinafter DHS Brief in L-R-].
111. Id. at 10 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original).
112. Id. at 14, 29.

Doedens_JCI (Do Not Delete)

1/6/2015 3:08 PM

The Politics of Domestic Violence-Based Asylum Claims

127

findings.113 In light of the additional evidence, the Department of Homeland
Security stipulated that L-R- should be granted asylum, and an IJ granted the
asylum in a summary order in August of 2010.114
Against the backdrop of Matter of L-R- and Matter of R-A-, the recent
decision in Matter of A-R-C-G- represents a groundbreaking achievement after
nearly fifteen years of advocacy, as the Board of Immigration Appeals finally
rendered a binding decision in which domestic violence served as the basis for
an asylum claim.115 The respondents in the case, the lead respondent (“A-R-CG”) and her three minor children, were all natives of Guatemala who entered the
United States without inspection.116 The lead respondent, as a credible witness,
told the Immigration Judge of how she suffered weekly beatings at the hands of
her husband after her first child was born, and of how one of those beatings
resulted in a broken nose and another resulted in chemical burns when her
husband threw paint thinner on her.117 The respondent testified that she
contacted the local police several times in an effort to stop the violence, which
included rape, but the police maintained that they would not interfere in marital
conflicts.118 When the police came to the family home after the respondent’s
husband hit her on the head, the husband threatened to kill the respondent if she
tried to get the police involved again.119 Furthermore, the respondent attempted
to escape her abusive relationship by moving within Guatemala’s borders to stay
with her father and by moving to Guatemala City, but her husband always
found her and the abuse always continued when she returned.120 The respondent
believed that this pattern will repeat or worsen if she returned to Guatemala.121
A-R-C-G-’s asylum claim was initially unsuccessful because of the
requirement that her persecution be suffered on account of her membership in the
particular social group of “married wom[e]n in Guatemala who [were] unable to
leave the relationship.”122 The Immigration Judge found that the husband’s
actions were merely the arbitrary criminal acts of a husband against his wife,
rather than a rational pattern of persecutory conduct.123 Naturally, the
respondent appealed the Immigration Judge’s decision, and the BIA requested
supplemental briefing on the issue of whether “domestic violence can, in some
instances, form the basis for a claim of asylum or withholding of removal under
sections 208(a) and 241(b)(3) of the [Immigration Nationality] Act.”124 Thus
pressured, the Department of Homeland Security was forced to concede that (1)

113. Matter of L-R-, CTR. FOR GEND. & REFUGEE STUDIES, http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/ourwork/matter-l-r (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
114. Id.
115. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I & N Dec. 388, 388 (B.I.A. 2014).
116. Id. at 389. The minor respondents were derivatives of their mother’s asylum application, so
the BIA did not address their individual claims for asylum.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I & N Dec. 388, 389 (B.I.A. 2014).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 389–90.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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the harm the respondent suffered rose to the level of past persecution, and (2)
that this persecution occurred on account of her membership in the particular
social group of “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their
relationship.”125 The only issue on which the DHS was unwilling to concede
defeat was whether the “Guatemalan Government was unwilling or unable to
control the “private” actor” (i.e. the respondent’s husband).126
The Board of Immigration Appeals easily agreed with both parties that the
lead respondent had shown that she was a member of a particular social group
and suffered persecution on account of that status. The BIA pointed to the recent
precedents of Matter of W-G-R- and Matter of M-E-V-G- for the three requirements
for any asylum claim based on membership in a particular social group—the
asylum applicant “must establish that the group is (1) composed of members
who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity,
and (3) socially distinct within the society in question.”127 According to the BIA,
the lead respondent’s particular social group was defined by two common
immutable characteristics: gender and marital status.128 While gender has been
established as an immutable characteristic since Matter of Acosta,129 the
qualification of marital status as an immutable characteristic “where the
individual is unable to leave the relationship”130 is an important concession for
domestic violence-based asylum claims. The BIA qualified this development on
the consideration of a “range of factors,” many of which are dependent on local
religious, cultural, and legal customs.131
With the immutable characteristics thus established, the BIA found that the
lead respondent’s proffered particular social group had sufficient particularity
because “married,” “women,” and “unable to leave the relationship” are easily
and commonly defined in Guatemalan society, and that the combination of the
terms to define a single particular social group in this case “create[s] a group
with discrete and definable boundaries.”132 Furthermore, in order to find that the
lead respondent’s particular social group has sufficient social distinction, the BIA
cites both the DHS’s agreement that the group exists,133 as well as the evidence in
the record of Guatemala’s culture of “machismo and family violence” 134 and
Guatemala’s documented difficulty dealing with sexual offenses, including
spousal rape and domestic violence crimes.135
125. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I & N Dec. 388, 390 (B.I.A. 2014).
126. Id. at 395.
127. Id. at 392.
128. Id. at 392–93.
129. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (finding that sex is an immutable
characteristic).
130. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I & N Dec. at 392–93.
131. Id. at 393.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 394.
134. Id. at 388 (citing Guatemala Failing Its Murdered Women: Report, CANADA BROAD. CORP. NEWS
(July 18, 2006, 11:06 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/guatemala-failing-its-murdered-womenreport-1.627240).
135. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I & N Dec. 388, 394 (B.I.A. 2014) (citing BUREAU OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
DEMOCRACY, AND LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS: GUATEMALA
(2009), available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/wha/119161.htm).
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Even though the lead respondent successfully showed that she was a
member of a particular social group, and that she suffered persecution on
account of her membership in that particular social group, the Board of
Immigration Appeals was not able to grant her asylum on these grounds.136
Rather, she was still required to submit additional evidence to demonstrate that
the Guatemalan police’s failure to take any sort of action in response to her
complaints meant that the “government was unwilling or unable to control her
husband.”137 Upon such a showing, the burden of proof would shift to the
Department of State, who would then be required to show either that there had
been a “fundamental change in circumstances such that the respondent no longer
has a well-founded fear of persecution”138 or that “internal relocation is possible
and is not unreasonable.”139 Missing from the BIA’s opinion was an admission
that the respondent’s multiple unsuccessful attempts to leave her husband by
staying with her father and moving to Guatemala City probably demonstrated
that internal relocation would not be possible for her and would in fact be
unreasonable.
D. Where We Are Now: The Implications of Matter of R-A- and Matter of L-R- in
Light of Matter of A-R-C-GThe introduction of Matter of A-R-C-G- into the legal landscape is a
significant step forward in the development of a concrete and dependable legal
basis for domestic violence-based asylum claims. However, the highly political
discretion that pervaded the pre-Matter of A-R-C-G- landscape continues today.
The legal and practical problems that underpinned the use of Matter of R-A- and
Matter of L-R- as the basis for domestic violence-based asylum claims survive in
large part, and it is therefore important to examine those problems as they
existed before the most recent decision, and how Matter of A-R-C-G- may affect
those issues in the future.
Even a cursory review of Matter of R-A- and Matter of L-R- reveals a number
of legal and practical problems for bringing domestic violence-based asylum
claims. First, neither Matter of R-A- nor Matter of L-R- is binding precedent.
Although the initial BIA decision and the Attorney General’s decision in Rody
Alvadrado’s case have been published, the final BIA decision and the
Immigration Judge’s order granting asylum after ten years of litigation are not
published and therefore are not binding precedent. Further, none of the opinions
in Matter of L-R- are published. As a result, the most that an asylum lawyer can
gain from these two cases, where a woman was granted asylum based on her
membership in a particular social group and the persecution she suffered in her
abusive marriage, is an opportunity to push the Department of Homeland
Security to remain consistent in its requirements for a successful asylum claim.
Second, the success of these two cases was heavily dependent on many,
many hours of legal work. The countless hours of research to find the necessary

136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 395.
Id.
Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A), (ii) (2014)).
Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B), (ii) (2014)).
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legal theory and the appropriate experts would have been almost impossible for
an individual asylum applicant to do by him or herself. Even if the legal theory
were fairly self-explanatory, the effort to find the necessary evidence and fulfill
the complicated requirements of any asylum claim is practically impossible for
anyone without a legal education (or at least for anyone not in the process of
getting such an education). The difficulty of presenting a domestic violencebased asylum case would not be a problem if all applicants had a right to free
legal representation upon a showing of indigence. However, since Immigration
Court is an administrative court and since immigration law is not considered
equivalent to criminal law, individuals in immigration proceedings are allowed,
but not entitled, to have legal representation, even though they are often strongly
advised at their initial hearing to procure representation.140 TRAC Immigration,
an independent organization at Syracuse University that collects data on
immigration case law, found that although asylum seekers are becoming more
and more successful, this increase in approval rates is attributable in part to a
concurrent increase in legal representation—in 2010, 91% of all asylum seekers
were represented, compared to 52% in 1986.141 Further, during FY 2010, 54% of
asylum seekers with legal representation were actually granted asylum,
compared to only 11% of those without legal representation.142
This significance of legal representation becomes even more significant in
light of the strained budgets of free immigration legal services organizations.
According to data from the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS),
there are about 864 immigration nonprofits scattered across the country.143 A
quarter of those have an annual budget of less than $250,000, another quarter
have budgets of less than $999,999, a little over another quarter have budgets of
less than $5 million, and a quarter have budgets of more than $5 million.144 In
addition to these limited budgets, “the ratio of nonprofits that provide legal aid
to immigrants to potential undocumented clients is considerable….”145 As such,
it is apparent that not all qualified immigrants can even obtain access to free legal
services, and may therefore be forced to defend their asylum (as well as other
immigration relief) cases pro se, thus risking a far higher rate of failure. For the
population of domestic violence victims, the prospect of failure and the danger of
being sent back to a country where his or her abuser can easily find him or her
weighs heavily against even trying to apply for asylum, and weighs in favor of
living instead in the shadows as an undocumented immigrant.
Further, when one examines the rate of denial of asylum applications, it is
140. Lucas Guttentag & Ahilan Arulanantham, Extending the Promise of Gideon: Immigration,
Deportation, and the Right to Counsel, 39 HUMAN RIGHTS 14 (2013) (arguing that the right to counsel
found in Gideon v. Wainwright should be extended to individuals in deportation proceedings, given
the abundance of similarities between immigration law and criminal law).
141. Asylum Denial Rate Reaches All Time Low: FY 2010 Results, A Twenty-Five Year Perspective,
TRAC IMMIGRATION (Sept. 2, 2010), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/240/ (last visited Nov.
14, 2014).
142. Id.
143. Erwin de Leon & Robert Roach, Immigrant Legal-Aid Organizations in the United States, URBAN
INST. (Oct. 2013), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412928-Immigrant-Legal-AidOrganizations-in-the-United-States.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
144. Id.
145. Id.
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apparent that there are certain political preconceptions at play in the minds of
the Immigration Judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals. Countries with
the highest denial rates include El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, the
Dominican Republic, Honduras, Mexico, Ecuador, Vietnam, and the
Philippines.146 Interestingly, these countries are also high on the list of the
countries of origin for undocumented immigrants in the United States.147 Among
the countries with the lowest rate of asylum denial are Iraq, the former Soviet
Union, Yugoslavia, Somalia, China, Iran, and Afghanistan.148 As such, if a victim
of domestic violence (or any other sort of persecution) comes from a country that
the United States sees as a significant source of undocumented immigrants, he or
she will also have to fight to show that they will not be part of the flood across
the border.
When one looks specifically at the rate at which domestic violence-based
asylum claims are granted and denied, it becomes apparent that the lack of
clarity and binding precedent in the case law and regulations, and the resulting
increased degree of discretion on the part of Immigration Judges, has resulted in
disparate outcomes across the United States. For example, Blaine Bookey
conducted an analysis of 206 case outcomes in domestic violence-based asylum
claims in the United States from 1994 to 2012, and found that “the absence of
applicable norms and the shifting policy positions on the part of [the Department
of Homeland Security] have continued to produce contradictory and arbitrary
outcomes in domestic violence asylum cases.”149 While some IJs choose to follow
the precedent of Matter of R-A- and Matter of L-R- and grant applicants who have
suffered serious domestic violence asylum, other IJs refuse to grant asylum
because they consider domestic violence to be a purely personal dispute, beyond
the reach of asylum law.150 According to Bookey, “whether a woman fleeing
domestic violence will receive protection in the United States seems to depend
not on the consistent application of objective principles, but rather on the view of
her individual judge, often untethered to any legal principles at all.”151
A woman fleeing domestic violence in the era before the most recent BIA
decision of Matter of A-R-C-G- therefore had her right to be free from persecution
nullified on several fronts. First, she could not know what the appropriate legal
framework would be, since the final decisions in both Matter of R-A- and Matter
of L-R- are unpublished, and provide little information other than to find that,
based on the stipulated agreement of the Department of Homeland Security with
146. Asylum Denial Rates by Nationality Before and After the Attorney General’s Directive (by denial
rate), TRAC IMMIGRATION (2010),
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/240/include/nationality_denial.html (last visited Nov. 14,
2014) [hereinafter Asylum Denial Rates].
147. Michael Hofer, et al., Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United
States: January 2011, POPULATION ESTIMATES (Mar. 2012) (listing, in order of estimated undocumented
population, Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, China, Philippines, India, Korea, Ecuador,
and Vietnam), available at
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_ill_pe_2011.pdf.
148. Asylum Denial Rates, supra note 146.
149. Blaine Bookey, Domestic Violence as a Basis for Asylum: An Analysis of 206 Case Outcomes in the
United States from 1994 to 2012, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L. J. 107, 147 (2013).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 147–48.

Doedens_JCI (Do Not Delete)

132 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

1/6/2015 3:08 PM

Volume 22:111 2014

the applicant that she has suffered persecution on account of her membership in
a particular social group, the applicant’s application for asylum will actually be
granted. Second, it was (and continues to be) nearly impossible for anyone to win
any asylum case without legal representation, let alone a complicated asylum
case based on domestic violence, and the financial resources of legal aid
organizations were (and continue to be) extremely limited. This disfavors women
who do not have the ideal case for impact litigation and are unable to finance
paid legal representation. Finally, even if an individual applicant managed to do
all necessary legal work and procure representation, the success of her claim still
depended on the opinion of the individual Immigration Judge.
In light of Matter of A-R-C-G-, the most significant change is that there is
now a binding decision establishing that domestic violence can be the basis for an
asylum claim, where the particular social group is Guatemalan women who are
unable to leave their marriage. There are, however, three enduring limitations on
the ability of domestic violence to serve as a basis for asylum. First, the lead
respondent in Matter of A-R-C-G- did not actually receive asylum based on this
decision – she still had to show that the Guatemalan government was unable or
unwilling to control her husband (the private actor), and the Department of
Homeland Security would most likely argue that it would have been both
reasonable and practicable for her to move within Guatemala, rather than enter
the United States without inspection, along with her three minor children.
Second, the Department of Homeland Security made an essential concession
in this case, as it did in Matter of L-R-, that the lead respondent both suffered
persecution and this persecution was on account of her membership in the
particular social group. With this concession, the BIA can more easily overcome
the Immigration Judge’s initial finding that the respondent had not
demonstrated that her husband “abused her in order to overcome the fact that she
was a married woman in Guatemala who was unable to leave the
relationship.”152 Essentially, the Board of Immigration Appeals decided issues
that had already been agreed upon by both sides, and merely made that
concession binding on itself in the future.
Third, this binding decision can only go so far, since it is subject to the same
financial and knowledge constraints in place before the decision was issued. This
is still only a single decision with fairly atrocious facts, where the lead
respondent managed to gain both representation and the attention of prominent
immigration law organizations.153 The BIA decision is limited to an extremely
fact-specific analysis that still leaves significant discretion to Immigration Judges
to determine whether the persecution suffered by an applicant was actually on
account of a particular social group defined by the requisite immutable
characteristics with sufficient particularity and social distinction. The Federal
Regulations continue to provide that “the question whether a person is a
member of a particular social group is a finding of fact that [the BIA] review[s]
152. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I & N Dec. 388, 389–90 (B.I.A. 2014) (internal quotations omitted)
(emphasis added).
153. Several prominent organizations filed amici curiae in this case, including the American
Immigration Lawyers Association, the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies, the Federation for
American Immigration Reform, the National Immigrant Justice Center, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, and Williams & Connolly, LLP. Id. at 388.
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for clear error.”154
III.

OTHER GENDER-BASED ASYLUM CLAIMS: WHY ARE THEY DIFFERENT?

Other gender-based and sex-based asylum claims are more successful than
domestic violence-based asylum claims for two reasons. First, the particular
social group itself more easily satisfies the conditions of being defined by
immutable characteristics, with sufficient particularity and social distinction or
social visibility. Second, the persecution is more likely to be understood as
“foreign” to the United States, and therefore more likely to be considered
political rather than simply personal.
For example, consider the case of female genital mutilation (FGM). The
practice is defined by the World Health Organization as “the partial or total
removal of the female external genitalia or other injury to the female genital
organs for non-medical reasons.”155 Any mention of the practice gets Western
feminists and human rights activists up in arms, but it is widely believed that
any form of the practice occurs mostly outside of the United States.156 The
practice is associated with countries and cultures perceived as underdeveloped,
making it easier to denounce the practice as an atrocious human rights violation.
This stands in stark contrast to domestic violence, which occurs frequently in the
United States—in 2008, an intimate partner was responsible for one in five rapes
or sexual assaults committed against females.157
Given this distinction between domestic violence and FGM, it is not
surprising that the BIA found persecution on account of membership in a
particular social group in Matter of Kasinga in 1996, and the BIA felt the need in
Matter of R-A- to distinguish Rody’s situation from that of the applicant in the
earlier case.158 In Matter of Kasinga, the court recognized first that FGM could
154.
155.

Id. at 391 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2014)).
SANCTUARY FOR FAMILIES, FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION IN THE UNITED STATES: PROTECTING
GIRLS AND WOMEN IN THE U.S. FROM FGM AND VACATION CUTTING 1 (2013), available at
http://www.sanctuaryforfamilies.org/storage/sanctuary/documents/report_onfgm_w_cover.pdf
(internal citations omitted). WHO divides the practice into four categories:
Type I
Clitorodectomy, or the partial or total removal of the clitoris and/or clitoral
hood.
Type II
The partial or total removal of the clitoris and inner labia, with or without the
removal of the outer labia.
Type III
Infibulation, or the removal of the external female genitalia and the sealing or
narrowing of the vaginal opening using stitches or glue. The clitoris may or may
not be removed. A small hole is left for urination and menstruation and women
subjected to this procedure are later cut open for intercourse and childbirth.
Type IV
All other harmful procedures to the female genitalia for non-medical purposes,
such as pricking, piercing, incising, scraping, and cauterization.
Id.
156. Jodie Gummow, Evidence Shows That Illegal Female Genital Cutting Is a Growing Phenomenon in
US, ALTERNET (June 21, 2013), http://www.alternet.org/gender/evidence-shows-illegal-femalegenital-cutting-growing-phenomenon-us (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
157. 10 Facts on Female Victims of Violence, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Oct. 21, 2009),
http://blogs.justice.gov/main/archives/220 (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
158. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec 906, 919 (B.I.A. 1999) (finding that one of the reasons that Rody’s
social group fails to qualify is that Rody “has not shown that spouse abuse is itself an important
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constitute persecution for the purposes of the refugee definition.159 The court
further found that the group of “young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe
who have not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice”
qualified as a particular social group because it was defined by immutable
characteristics.160 In particular, the BIA found that the “characteristic of having
intact genitalia is one that is so fundamental to the individual identity of a young
woman that she should not be required to change it.”161 Finally, the BIA was able
to find that the persecution the applicant suffered was on account of her
membership in the particular social group because the record demonstrated that
“FGM is practiced, at least in some significant part, to overcome sexual
characteristics of young women of the tribe who have not been, and do not wish
to be, subjected to FGM.”162 By making this decision, the BIA was able to fulfill
its desire to “save the women” from the barbaric practice, while not
compromising the integrity of its own society’s dark underbelly.
A similar pattern is evident in the case of asylum claims based on sexual
orientation. For example, in Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, the Board of Immigration
Appeals found that homosexuals in Cuba constituted a particular social group
for the purposes of asylum law, where the Cuban government classified
homosexuals as a group, criminalized homosexuality, maintained files on alleged
homosexuals, and required registration and periodic exams.163 The Cuban
applicant could therefore easily show that he was classified as a homosexual by
the Cuban government (i.e. considered a member of the alleged particular social
group by his alleged persecutors), and that he suffered persecution on account of
that membership. Importantly, the BIA noted the uncontroverted nature of the
IJ’s finding that homosexuality is an immutable characteristic, despite the
Immigration and Naturalization Service’s argument that homosexual activity
“…is not a basis for finding a social group within the contemplation of the Act”
as such a conclusion “would be tantamount to awarding discretionary relief to
those involved in behavior that is not only socially deviant in nature, but in
violation of the laws or regulations of the country as well.”164 The BIA’s refusal to
entertain the Service’s proposal that homosexuality did not qualify because it
would be analogous to encouraging general lawlessness indicates the political
underpinnings of its decision. Even though homosexuality was still frowned
upon in many parts of the United States when Matter of Toboso-Alfonso was
decided in 1990, there was still a prevailing attitude that the constant surveillance
and invasive medical examinations required in Cuba would not be tolerated in
the United States.165 The applicant was of course also helped by the fact that he

societal attribute, or, in other words, that the characteristic of being abused is one that is important
within Guatemalan society,” contrary to Matter of Kasinga, where the fact of not yet being “cut” was
an important attribute in the relevant society).
159. Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996).
160. Id. at 365–66.
161. Id. at 366.
162. Id. at 367.
163. Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 820–21 (B.I.A. 1990).
164. Id. at 822 (internal quotations omitted).
165. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (holding that a Georgia sodomy statute did
not violate the fundamental rights of homosexuals because at least twenty-five state still had such
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claimed persecution not by a non-state actor but by the Cuban government, an
entity out of favor with the U.S. federal government since the 1960s.
As American positions toward homosexuality evolve and the belief that
individuals should not be persecuted on account of their sexual orientation gains
more traction in the United States,166 the view of the BIA in Matter of TobosoAlfonso will become the “civilized” one, and the United States could develop a
need to “save the (stereotypically effeminate or biologically female)
homosexuals” from their “uncivilized” countries and cultures of origin.
CONCLUSION
By first outlining the basics of asylum law and then proceeding to focus on
how gender-based asylum claims in general and domestic violence, female
genital mutilation, and sexual orientation-based asylum claims are legally
possible and are actually granted, I have shown that the degree of discretion and
disparity between the legal possibilities and the actual rate at which asylum
claims are granted is truly astonishing. If, as was the initial impetus for the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, every individual is entitled to be
free from persecution, then the fact that individual asylum applicants so often
have difficulty demonstrating that the horrors they have suffered occurred on
account of an enumerated ground should be cause for concern.
A skeptic might ask why the United States has to be the one to take in these
asylum seekers and recognize their persecution. The answer is fairly simple. If
we are serious about enforcing human rights and protecting every individual’s
right to be free from persecution, then it does not matter why these asylum
seekers picked the U.S. Instead of sending asylum seekers back to their lives of
violence and persecution, the United States needs to do more to treat the
symptom. We cannot just build a wall of border patrol agents and barbed wire
while we look south to a country embroiled in a de facto civil war and further
south to countries struggling under the dominance of gangs.
In the case of domestic violence-based asylum claims, the effective
nullification of the right to be free from persecution due to the uncertain legal
standards, the simultaneous importance and difficulty of procuring legal
representation, and the unpredictability of an Immigration Judge’s perception of
an individual applicant’s domestic violence as purely personal or somehow
political or based on membership in a qualifying particular social group is even
more troubling. Perhaps there is a need to amend the original definition of what
constitutes a refugee or asylee to accommodate modern understandings of
formerly “private” violence. Perhaps the United States needs to develop a new
visa specifically for undocumented victims of domestic violence, in the same way
that the Violence Against Women Act allows abused spouses of U.S. citizens and
legal permanent residents to apply for their own legal permanent residency
independently of their abusive spouses, or the U-Visa creates a pathway to

laws on the books, and states had the ability to legislate for the purpose of enforcing certain notions
of morality).
166. United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013) (outlining the expansion of the right to
marry to same-sex couples, as notions of equality have changed).
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citizenship for victims of domestic violence who report the crime to the police
and help bring their abusers to justice.167 However, given the current reluctance
of Congress to pass comprehensive immigration reform, and the difficulties
Congress had in even reauthorizing the Violence Against Women Act in the
summer of 2013,168 it seems unlikely that such legislative remedies will come to
pass. As such, immigration attorneys and advocates, as well as their clients and
those who are unable to obtain representation but may have an actionable claim
for asylum based on domestic violence, are left in limbo. The most one can do is
put the system to the test, force it to enunciate its rationale for denying (or
granting) asylum to a particular individual, while doing one’s best to comply
with the complicated legal standards promulgated under Matter of R-A- and
Matter of L-R- and developing the binding precedent of Matter of A-R-C-G-. In
short, the players must play the politics, let adjudicators hear the stories in the
terms they want to hear, and hope that their story fits the requirements for relief.

167. Fact Sheet: USCIS Issues Guidance for Approved Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) SelfPetitioners, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. (APR. 11, 2008),
http://www.uscis.gov/archive/archive-news/fact-sheet-uscis-issues-guidance-approved-violenceagainst-women-act-vawa-self-petitioners (last visited Nov. 14, 2014); Victims of Criminal Activity, U
Nonimmigrant Status, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. (Jan. 9,
2014), http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/victims-human-trafficking-other-crimes/victimscriminal-activity-u-nonimmigrant-status/victims-criminal-activity-u-nonimmigrant-status (last
visited Nov. 14, 2014).
168. Kate Pickert, What’s Wrong with the Violence Against Women Act?, TIME (Feb. 27, 2013),
http://nation.time.com/2013/02/27/whats-wrong-with-the-violence-against-women-act/ (last
visited Nov. 14, 2014) (reporting on the political fight surrounding the reauthorization of VAWA).

